E-health Services with Secure Mobile Agent by Sulaiman, Rossilawati et al.
  
 
 
 
This is the published version of this work: 
 
Sulaiman, R., Huang, X., & Sharma, D. (2009). E-health Services with Secure Mobile Agent. In 
J. Almhana, & A. Boukerche (Eds.), Communication Networks and Services Research, Annual 
Conference (Vol. 1, pp. 270-277). United States: IEEE, Institute of Electrical and Electronics 
Engineers. https://doi.org/10.1109/CNSR.2009.49  
 
This file was downloaded from: https://researchprofiles.canberra.edu.au/en/publications/e-
health-services-with-secure-mobile-agent 
 
©2009 IEEE.  Personal use of this material is permitted.  Permission from IEEE must be 
obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing 
this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for 
resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this 
work in other works 
 
 
Notice:  
The published version is reproduced here in accordance with the publisher’s archiving policy 
2009. 
 
 
 
E-health Services with Secure Mobile Agent 
 
Rossilawati Sulaiman, Xu Huang, Dharmendra Sharma  
Department of Information Science & Engineering 
University of Canberra 
Australia 
{Rossillawati.Sulaiman, Xu.Huang, Dharmendra.Sharma}@canberra.edu.au
 
 
Abstract— This paper establishes a new security mechanism 
for online communications using mobile agents.  E-health has 
been widely used as a communication system and information 
changes to deliver health services to the users through the 
Internet.  However, the Internet imposes threats that will risk 
the information in transit. Therefore it is important to ensure 
that the communication is safe and the user’s privacy is 
protected.  This paper extends our previous research results, 
Multilayer Communication (MLC) approach [1], and 
introduced mobile agents to MLC in e-health.  The 
cryptographic protocols such as encryption/decryption, digital 
signature, and hash code are used as protection mechanisms.  
We focus on how Sender can securely transfer sensitive 
information to Recipient while still maintaining control over it.  
Sender keeps the key for decryption at his/her side until the 
agent needs it.  A token is carried by the agent, which is used 
as a mean to call home platform to obtain the key for 
decryption processes.  The significant of this new mechanism is 
that it gives Sender control over the transmitted data.  
Recipient can also avoid burden with the encryption details as 
long as he/she knows that the message is indeed comes from 
Recipient. 
Keywords-Mobile agent, security, e-health. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The electronic health, or e-health, enables the delivery of 
health care services through the Internet. E-health improves 
the relationship between patients and doctors, as well as 
provides online education for patients and physicians 
through online resources [2]. In e-health, patients and 
medical experts communicate by exchanging information. 
This is useful especially for remote users. For example, a 
patient at home can communicate remotely with a doctor at a 
hospital. Both parties can communicate online, for 
consultation sessions or discuss anything related to health 
care issues. Currently, many applications have been 
developed to support communications and information 
exchanges among doctors, and patients, such as video 
conferencing [3], emails [4], and web-based messaging 
[5],[6]. These applications involve the use of the Internet 
network. However, there exist many threats to the Internet, 
such as network attacks and information breaches by 
intruders, or malicious software, which is a program that is 
purposely created to perform illegal operation on the 
computer system, like viruses and worms. These threats can 
cause severe damages to the computer systems as well as the 
information. The information might be stolen or modified 
and may cause undesirable consequences. For example, if a 
patient’s medical information is violated or modified by a 
third party, the patient may not receive correct medications 
and furthermore, may endanger the patient’s life. Therefore, 
it is important to secure these communications.  
In this research, emphasis is given on securing online 
communications, specifically in the e-health domain using 
mobile agents [7] and cryptography protocols. The mobile 
agents are chosen to carry sensitive information during a 
communication in e-health. However, mobile agents are also 
exposed to security threats, which are threats from malicious 
hosts and malicious agents [8],[9]. An agent carrying the 
information must be protected against other malicious 
agents, or malicious hosts that can tamper with its code or 
data. On the other hand, a host receiving the agent also 
concern on the incoming agent that might do malicious 
activities once its code is executed. To avoid these threats, 
cryptography protocols like encryption/decryption, digital 
signature, and hash code are used to protect mobile agent 
code and the carried message. The protocols are also able to 
provide mechanisms to verify the authenticity, 
confidentiality and the integrity of the code and data that 
arrived at the host. The generation of the symmetric keys for 
a communication between two users is according to the MLC 
approach [1], which will be described further in this paper.  
The rest of the paper is organized like the following: 
Section II discusses the MLC approach. The security 
architecture is discussed in Section III, which explains the 
security requirements and the proposed security mechanism. 
The implementation is explained in Section IV. Then, the 
related work is discussed in Section V, and finally this paper 
is concluded with a summary in Section VI. 
II. MULTILAYER COMMUNICATION APPROACH (MLC) 
In order to fully understand our proposed security 
mechanism, the MLC approach is discussed in this section. 
The MLC approach is basically a security model that 
classifies information into five layers as described in Table I. 
The classification of the information is based on the 
sensitivity of the information being transmitted between two 
users. For simplicity purposes, the users in this approach are 
identified as Doctor, Patient, Nurse, Social Worker (SW), 
Paramedic, System Coordinator (SC), and System 
Administrator (SA).  
In e-health, there is information that can be considered as 
extremely sensitive or less sensitive depending on where the 
information came from. For example, information that came 
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from communications between doctors, or a doctor and a 
patient, or a nurse and a patient, contains extremely sensitive 
data and must be protected with the highest security 
mechanisms. There is also information that is considered as 
less sensitive, for instance, a communication between a 
social worker and a nurse. This information can be protected 
with low security mechanisms. With the varying sensitivity 
levels of the information, the MLC approach is introduced, 
which classifies the information into five layers. 
This approach is an alternative way to provide different 
kinds of communications to different users according to their 
needs. Different security mechanisms can be provided at 
each layer depending on the sensitivity of the data. Highest 
security mechanisms can be applied to the extremely 
sensitive information, while low security mechanisms can be 
applied to the low sensitive information. MLC treats every 
communication differently based on the sensitivity of the 
information being exchanged unlike Virtual Private Network 
(VPN) or Secure Shell (SSH). By providing different 
security mechanisms in every layer, an organization can 
choose its own security mechanisms flexibly, depending on 
cost and performance. 
In MLC, each layer has its own range of key lengths for 
data and/or channel security. Data security involves the 
encryption, digital signature and hash of data, while channel 
encryption provides a secure SSL channel to transfer the 
data. For a communication between two people, say, Doctor 
and Nurse, the layer of communication (com_layer) is 
identified. The com_layer value is used to determine the 
security mechanisms and symmetric key lengths that will be 
applied to the data in a particular communication session. 
com_layer can be determined by using a default layer (L0) 
value assigned to each user. For Patient, Doctor, and Nurse 
the L0 value is Layer 1. For Paramedic and System 
Coordinator, the L0 value is Layer 2. Social Worker is 
assigned to Layer 3, and finally System Administrator is 
assigned to Layer 4. 
The following describes the rules to determine com_layer 
value for a communication between Sender and Recipient: 
• If the L0 values for Sender and Recipient are the 
same, then the com_layer for that communication 
will be Recipient’s L0 
• If the L0 value for Sender is greater than the 
Recipient’s, then the com_layer for that 
communication is Sender’s L0 
• If the L0 value for Sender is smaller than the 
Recipient’s, then the com_layer for that 
communication is Recipient’s L0 
In summary, the com_layer value can be identified by 
comparing both L0 values of Sender and Recipient. The one 
with a larger value will be chosen as com_layer. If both 
default layers are the same, that default layer will be used as 
the com_layer value. After the com_layer value is obtained, 
the security mechanisms for the communication can be 
determined, that is, whether the communication needs data 
security, or channel security, or both data and channel 
security.  
TABLE I.  THE CLASSIFICATION AND SECURITY MECHANISMS IN THE 
MLC APPROACH  
The com_layer is associated with the length of the 
symmetric key encryption algorithms: 
Layer 1: key length =192-bit key and longer  
Layer 2: key length = 80-bit key to 191-bit key 
Layer 3: key length = 112-bit key to128-bit key 
Layer 4: key length = 80 to less than 112-bit of key 
The symmetric key is used for encryption processes to 
provide data security. Higher layer uses longer key length 
and lower layer uses shorter key length. The key lengths are 
also used as a guide to establish SSL channel to provide 
channel security. This is done by using a suitable cipher suite 
according to the layer. The next section describes the 
proposed security mechanism. 
Layer of 
communication 
Types of data 
transmitted 
Security Mechanisms 
and symmetric key 
lengths 
Layer 1:  
Extremely 
Sensitive data 
Doctor⇔Doctor   
Doctor⇔Patient 
Doctor⇔Nurse 
Nurse⇔Patient 
Patient’s personal 
information (name, 
address, age, gender, 
contact person etc), 
medical history, 
diagnosis, test result, 
current treatment 
and prescriptions 
Data and 
channel 
security 
192-bit 
key and 
longer  
 
 
Layer 2:  Highly 
sensitive data 
Paramedic⇔SC 
 
Patient’s personal 
information, medical 
information: 
allergic, blood 
pressure, current 
condition 
 
Data 
security 
(using 
wireless 
network) 
 
80-bit 
key to 
191-bit 
key 
 
 
Layer 3:  
Medium sensitive 
data 
Doctor⇔SW 
Nurse⇔SW 
 
Patient’s personal 
information, 
medication 
information  
 
Channel 
security or 
data 
security 
 
112-bit 
key 
to128-bit 
key 
 
 
Layer 4:   
Low sensitive 
data 
SA ⇔ all users 
 
Information on the 
application system, 
user account, non-
medical related 
information such as 
IT technical problem 
 
Channel 
security or 
data 
security 
 
80-bit  to 
less than 
112-bit 
of key  
 
 
Layer 5:   
No sensitive data 
or Public 
The public  
 
Open channel: 
general information 
on the organization, 
information on 
health, diseases, 
frequently asked 
questions, annual 
reports, and services 
available 
 
Secure 
open 
channel: 
ID and 
password  
- 
 
Secure open 
channel: any user 
that wants to get 
access or contact 
information to any 
sensitive information 
(e.g.: a researcher)  
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III. SECURITY ARCHITECTURE 
A. Mobile agent paradigm  
A mobile agent is a program that can migrate or move 
from a home platform to another, carrying its code and data. 
When migrating, the agent invokes a method for migration. 
For example, in Jade [10], a method called doMove() is used, 
which permits the agent to migrate from its home platform to 
a remote platform. Once migrated, the code will be executed 
in the remote platform and the original agent is destroyed. 
The remote platform is responsible to recreate the agent and 
allow it to execute once it arrives there. At the remote 
platform, the mobile agents may communicate with the agent 
in the remote platform to negotiate and ask for resources. 
A user can delegate tasks to a mobile agent, dispatch the 
agent to another host, and execute the tasks there. In this 
research, the mobile agent is used to carry data to another 
host. There, the agent performs tasks on behalf of its owner. 
A mobile agent is robust, in a sense that if the destination 
platform is shut down while the agent is still there, the agent 
can take necessary actions such as to migrate back or 
terminate its activities [11]. It can send a notice to the home 
platform about its situation and terminate if required. 
Fig. 1 describes a communication between two doctors, 
say Doctor A and B. Using the MLC approach, DoctorA 
agent obtains the com_layer value for the communication 
with DoctorB agent (which is Layer 1). After that, the 
message that will be transmitted will be encrypted using the 
symmetric key, which length is according to Layer 1 (192-bit 
key or longer). A token will also be encrypted and carried 
along with the message. 
A Mobile Agent is created, and the code is signed by 
DoctorA agent, so that it could be verified at the Doctor 
B’s host. The symmetric key will be kept by DoctorA 
agent until it is needed by the agent. An SSL tunnel is 
established (Layer 1 provide data and channel security), and 
Mobile Agent is dispatched to Doctor B’s host to carry 
the message and its code (1).  
After arriving at the host, the Mobile Agent’s code is 
verified and executed if proven to be valid. While at the 
remote platform, Mobile Agent can communicate with 
the home platform (2) by sending the token it carried to 
request for additional information to continue its execution. 
After receiving the token, DoctorA agent sends the 
information needed to Mobile Agent (3) so that the agent 
can continue with its tasks.  
Another example is the communication between 
Paramedic and System Coordinator, which communicate 
using a mobile device. The com_layer value will be Layer 2, 
which provides symmetric key length from 80-bit to 191-bit 
to encrypt the message. Lower key lengths are provided to 
support low processing power devices. For Layer 3 
communications, for instance, between a nurse and a social 
worker, the organization can choose for either channel 
security or data security. For channel security, an SSL tunnel 
is established based on the default cipher suite available. For 
data security, the key length for the symmetric key is 
between 112-bit to 128-bit. Layer 4 communications are 
similar to Layer 3, except for the key length, which is from 
80-bit to 112-bit.    
Figure 1.  Communication between two users. 
B. Control of the Data 
In our approach, we focus on how Sender can securely 
transfer data to Recipient while maintaining control over the 
data. The ‘control over the data’ can be described as:  
1. If the message carried by Sender Agent is seized by 
an attacker, the attacker still cannot recover the 
plaintext 
2. Recipient or any other third party does not need to 
know the details of the decryption processes to 
recover the plaintext.  
One way for Sender to gain control over the data, is to 
keep part of the requirements for the decryption processes 
secret, such as part of the agent’s code, or parameters used 
for decryption. In this approach, the parameters for 
decrypting the ciphertext are kept with Sender until he/she 
knows that the mobile agent needs it. The parameters contain 
the symmetric key that encrypts the plaintext, hash of 
plaintext (for Recipient to check if the plaintext is tampered), 
and the information about the key, such as the types of the 
algorithms, key length, and encryption mode.  
A token, which is an encrypted random number, is 
carried by the mobile agent to the Recipient’s host. It is used 
as a ‘phone home’ [19] mechanism, where the agent sends 
back the token to the Sender. This is a way for the agent, to 
tell Sender that it wants the information kept at the Sender’s 
side for the decryption processes.  
The authenticity of the agent’s code is verified once it 
arrives at the host. If the agent’s code is valid, it is executed. 
Once executed, the agent is ready to perform the decryption 
process to recover the plaintext. However, the decryption key 
and the information of the key are at the Sender’s side. This 
is where the agent sends the token back to Sender to get the 
necessary information. To illustrate this concept, the next 
section describes the communication protocols between two 
parties, Doctor and Patient, which involve a mobile agent. 
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C. The Communication Protocols 
Figure 2.  Communication Protocols between Doctor Agent, mobile agent, 
and Patient Agent 
Doctor Agent creates an instance of a mobile agent and 
dispatches it to the Patient’s host, carrying the encrypted 
plain text. At the Patient’s host, the mobile agent is executed 
at the Patient’s host environment. The mobile agent 
communicates with Patient Agent in the process to discover 
the plain text. The communication protocols between Doctor 
Agent (DA), Mobile Agent (MA) and Patient Agent (PA) are 
described in Fig. 2.  
First, DA prepares the plain text, and applies appropriate 
security mechanisms to the plain text as well as to the MA’s 
code. Then, DA sends a request to PA to send a message. PA 
replies with an ‘accept’ or ‘reject’ message, depending on 
whether DA is trusted by PA. If PA’s reply is an ‘accept’, 
then, DA creates an instance of MA and dispatches it to carry 
the data to PA’s host. Once arrived, MA initiates a 
communication with PA: 
• MA requests PA to process the carried data  
• PA processes the data 
• PA informs MA whether the code is valid or not to be 
executed 
• If the code is valid, MA retrieves the token and 
requests PA to sign it 
• Once signed, MA sends the token back to DA 
• DA processes the token, and if the token is not 
tampered, DA sends information for decryption 
process to MA. 
• When the information is received, MA performs the 
decryption process to recover P 
• Then, MA forward P and H(P) to PA for verification 
• PA informs MA for the verification status 
• Finally, MA informs DA the result and terminates. 
The next sections discusses the security requirements at 
both Sender and Recipient‘s side. 
D. Security Requirements 
Before we explain the proposed security mechanism, we 
would like to discuss the security requirements to secure 
online communications between two users. We consider the 
previous example (Doctor-to-Patient communication) in 
Section III(C). Generally, both Doctor and Patient would 
want to make sure that the data transferred is safe from any 
unauthorized access, the data is not modified, and non-
repudiation can be proven. These requirements are identified 
as confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity.  
Confidentiality prevents an unauthorized user from 
accessing the information, which is usually accomplished by 
encrypting the data. Integrity prevents modification to the 
data. Any modification to the data will result in some 
changes in the chipertext. The changes can be detected by 
comparing two hashes of the data (data here means the 
plaintext or the mobile agent’s code), one that is carried by 
the MA, and the other one, which is computed from the 
newly recovered data. If both are the same, then PA knows 
that the data is not tampered. Authenticity lets PA knows that 
the information is originally coming from DA. A digital 
signature can be used for this purpose. When PA verifies the 
signature using DA’s public key, and found out that the 
signature is valid, PA knows that the signature has comes 
from DA, which it trusted. 
To simplify the understanding of the concept, the 
following symbols will be used throughout this paper: 
a. Public and Private keys of the recipient (PA): (pubKr, 
privKr) 
b. Public and Private keys of the sender (DA): (pubKs, 
privKs) 
c. Symmetric keys: K1, K2  
d. public and secret key: (Kp, Ks) 
e. Information kept at Sender’s side: info 
f. Plaintext, P  
g. Hash of P, H(P) 
h. Ciphertext, C 
i. Signature, S 
j. Agent’s code: Cd 
k. Hash of Cd, H(Cd) 
l. A Random number Rand, Token, T 
From the communication between Doctor and Patient, 
Doctor wants to send a plain text to Patient securely using 
mobile agent. Therefore, the plaint text as well as the mobile 
agent code that will be executed at the Patient’s host must be 
protected. The following explains the security requirements 
at Doctor and Patient’s side. 
 
1) The security requirements at the Doctor’s side:  
a. Protection of the plaintext (P): P must be protected 
to avoid unauthorized access or modification from 
any third party. This is done by encrypting it with a 
symmetric key (K1). K1 will be kept by DA and 
not sent to the PA’s host until it is needed by MA. 
b. A hash of P, H(P): H(P) is created and sent to PA 
to verify that P is not modified.  
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c. Token, T: T is created to be carried by MA, which 
will be sent back to DA to get K1. K1 will be used 
to recover P. 
d. Proof of identity: DA must make sure that PA will 
not fail to authenticate his/her agent at the Patient’s 
host, by signing his/her agent's code using privKs 
to produce a digital signature S. If the agent fails to 
be authenticated, the agent will not be allowed to 
execute at the Patient’s host. 
e. Protection of the agent’s code (Cd), T, and S: These 
three components must be protected from any 
unauthorized access. This is done by encrypting 
them with another symmetric key (K2). The 
signature needs to be encrypted because, an 
impostor, who is also trusted by  PA can remove S, 
add his/her own signature, then take the agent’s 
data, and add it to his/her own agent. Then this 
agent will be sent to PA without DA or PA knows 
that the agent is actually comes from the impostor. 
This is described as an attack on a targeted state 
[20].  
f. A hash of Cd, which is H(Cd), and send it to PA to 
verify that Cd is not modified. 
g. Protection to the key (K2) and H(Cd): This is to 
make sure that only PA can retrieve it. pubKr will 
be used to encrypt K2 and H(Cd). 
h. Requires that PA provides his/her privKr to decrypt 
the message carried by MA, as well as to sign T 
before MA sends it back to the DA. 
 
2) The security requirements at the Patient’s side:  
a. PA needs to check that the agent’s code is indeed 
comes from DA. PA must be able to associate the 
identity of the MA arrives with its owner. This is 
done by using pubKs to verify the signature S 
against Cd. 
b. It is important for PA to verify that the agent's code 
is not tampered before executing it. PA can 
compare a newly created hash of Cd, H(Cd) with 
the one carried by MA 
c. After P is recovered through a decrypting process, 
PA also needs to verify that P is not modified or 
tampered, by comparing a newly created hash of P, 
H(P) with the one carried by MA.  
After identifying the security requirements for both 
sides, the next sections onwards describe the step-by-step of 
the proposed security mechanism that happen at the 
Doctor’s and Patient’s host. 
E. The Proposed Security Mechanism 
This section discusses the cryptography protocols that are 
used to secure data and mobile agent’s code. We refer to the 
previous example of Doctor and Patient communications (in 
Section III(C).  
1) At the Doctor’s host, DA does the following: 
a. Identifies the com_layer value of the 
communication session. In this case, the com_layer 
value will follow rule number 1 (see Section III), 
which is Layer 1.  
 
b. Generates two symmetric keys (K1 and K2) 
according to the com_layer value. For this case, the 
key lengths for K1 and K2 will be in the range of 
192-bit key and longer.   
 
c. Encrypts P using K1 to produce a ciphertext, C.  
C = E(P)K1 
 
d. Generates a random number Rand 
 
e. Encrypts Rand with K1 to generate a token, T that 
will be carried by the agent. K1 is kept at the DA’s 
side until DA receives T from MA. 
T = E(Rand)K1 
 
f. Generates public and secret key (Kp, Ks). After T is 
received, Ks is used to encrypt the information that 
is kept with DA for decryption process. Kp will be 
embedded in Cd and sent to the Patient’s host. Kp 
will be used for decryption at the Patient’s host. 
The generation of (Kp, Ks) is one time per 
communication session. These keys will be 
disposed once the communication session is over. 
This is to avoid any third party from using the key 
in the next communication sessions.  
 
g. Signs Cd with privKs to produce a signature, S. 
The signature is used to verify that Cd is from DA.  
S = E(Cd)privKs 
 
h. Encrypts Cd, S, and T with K2 to produce 
Ciphercode.  
Ciphercode = E(Cd, S, T)K2 
 
i. To allow only PA to retrieve K2, it is encrypted 
with pubKr together with the hash of Cd, H(Cd) to 
produce Cipherkey. TA can later compute a new 
H(Cd) from Cd in 8, and compare it with the one in 
Cipherkey to check whether Cd is valid and not 
violated.  
Cipherkey = E(K2, H(Cd))pubKr 
 
j. Saves C, Ciphercode, and Cipherkey in a file. 
Establishes SSL connection, and dispatch a mobile 
agent to send Data file to the Patient’s host. The 
SSL connection is established to provide channel 
security. This is accordance with the MLC 
approach of Layer 1 that requires data protection 
and channel protection mechanism. 
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2) At the Patient’s host, TA does the following: 
(described in Fig. 3) 
Figure 3.  Processes at the Patient’s Host 
a. When PA receives a request to process a message 
from the mobile agent, PA uses privKr to decrypt 
Cipherkey to obtain K2 and H(Cd) 
D(Cipherkey) privKr = K2, H(Cd) 
 
b. Then, K2 is used to decrypt Ciphercode to get Cd, 
S, and T.  
D(Ciphercode)K2 = Cd, S, T 
 
c. Before executing Cd, PA checks that Cd is indeed 
come from DA. S is verified against Cd using 
pubKs 
 
d. Calculate a new H(Cd), and compared it with the 
one in (1), to check if Cd has been tampered. 
 
e. If both point (c) and (d) are valid, then Cd is 
executed. 
e1. When Cd is executed, it is ready to decrypt C 
to get P. But first, Cd retrieves T and requests 
PA to sign it, using its privKr. 
 
e2. Once signed, T is sent back to DA, to indicate 
that MA is ready for the decryption process 
• Upon receiving T, DA verifies the 
signature and decrypts T with K1.  
• If T is not modified, then DA encrypts K1, 
information on K1 (info), and H(P) with 
Ks to produce hashKey. The 
corresponding Kp is stored within the 
code Cd, and will later be retrieved by Cd 
at Patient’s host:  
hashKey = E(K1,Info,H(P))Ks. 
• Then, hashKey is sent back to the MA. 
 
e3. hashKey is received from DA 
 
e4. Again at the Patient’s host, Cd retrieves Kp, 
and use it to decrypt hashKey to obtain K1, 
info, and H(P).  
 
e5. Cd uses K1 and info to decrypt C to get plain 
text, P. 
 
e6. Afterwards, both P and H(P) will be 
forwarded to PA for verifying purposes. 
 
f. Finally, PA verifies P by calculating a new H(P) 
from P, and compare it with the one forwarded 
earlier. If proved valid, keep P. 
 
By using this mechanism, DA has the advantages of 
gaining control on the data carried by MA, because PA or 
any third party does not know about the details of the 
encryption key. Even though an attacker could get hold of 
the message from DA (hashKey at point e3), the attacker still 
cannot recover the plaintext as the key to decrypt hashKey, 
which is Kp, is at the Patient’s host. In addition, Kp is 
disposable, which is created only once per every 
communication. Kp and the corresponding Ks will be 
removed once a communication session is terminated. 
Another advantage for DA is that, when the token is 
received, DA knows that PA has been correctly executing 
MA: 
• The agent code will only be executed if PA has 
approved the authenticity and the integrity of the 
code.  
• The access to the resources at the Patient’s host is 
not denied. In this case, PA must provide its private 
key to decrypt and sign specific message (in a safe 
way through a specific function that will not risk the 
Recipient’s host). 
For PA on the other hand, it does not have to be burdened 
with the details of the decryption of the plaintext. PA only 
require to verify that the agent is indeed comes from the 
Doctor’s host by checking the signature and the integrity of 
the agent’s code. If both are valid, PA knows that the 
message and agent are from the trusted sender. In addition, 
PA can check whether the plain text is not tampered by 
calculating a new hash code, and compare it with the one 
received from the agent. 
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IV. IMPLEMENTATION 
We have implemented the proposed security mechanisms 
described in this paper as a proof-of-concept, using Jade 
[18], a Java-based FIPA compliant agent platform. Each 
user’s machine run a Jade agent platform and each agent on 
the platform is able to accept foreign agent (which is the 
mobile agent) by enabling the inter-platform mobility 
service. Each agent is created with behaviours that represent 
the roles or tasks of the agent. For our research, we 
implement agent classes that represent Sender such as DA 
(SenderAgent), Recipient such as TA 
(RecipientAgent), and the mobile agent such as MA 
(MobileAgentData). SenderAgent and 
RecipientAgent are instantiated by every platform, so 
that each platform can act as Sender and Recipient. 
MobileAgentData will be created by SenderAgent to 
carry the data to the Recipient’s side. MobileAgentData 
contains a behaviour instance that implements Cd. Cd will be 
executed after being verified by RecipientAgent. We 
use the FIPA-ACL performatives and ontology for the 
agents’ communications. At the Sender’s side, 
SenderAgent is responsible to prepare messages such as 
described in Section III-D(A). At the recipient’s side, 
RecipientAgent and MobileAgentData are 
responsible to execute the steps in Section III-D(B).    
For a proof-of-concept, we have implemented a one-to-
one communication for each layer using PKI support. As for 
the Doctor-Patient example, we provide AES 256-bit of key 
(or alternatively, we can use AES 192-bit of key for Layer 1) 
for both symmetric key. SHA1 algorithm is used to create 
hashes of P and Cd. For the asymmetric key, we create a pair 
of RSA key on the run, where the public key is embedded 
into the agent’s code. The public key will later be retrieved 
by MobileAgentData to decrypt the information 
received from the Sender’s side. 
For Layer 2, we provide Blowfish 80-bit (or Blowfish-
112 bit). Layer 3 and 4 uses channel or data security. For 
channel security, we use the default SSL connection with the 
default SSL configuration [13] provided by Jade. 
Alternatively, for data security, we use AES 128-bit (or 
Blowfish 112-bit) for Layer 3, and for Layer 4, we use 
Blowfish 80-bit (or Blowfish 112-bit). 
Because we have only implemented this protocol in one-
to-one communication, we have not taken into account the 
key management, especially the symmetric key management, 
which will be our future work. 
V. RELATED WORK 
The use of mobile agents in e-health has become a well 
accepted paradigm to support online communications 
[14],[15],[16]. There are many researches that use mobile 
agent approach to carry sensitive data from Sender to 
Recipient over the network. As the data is sensitive, 
mechanisms to protect the code and data are developed. This 
section discusses some of the solutions of mobile agent 
security that based on the cryptography protocols 
A mobile agent security mechanism is proposed in 
[16],[17] where the agent itself carries the protection 
mechanisms without depending on the Sender/owner's 
platform. At the destination host, the mobile agent code is 
authenticated and the code requests a service from the 
platform to decrypt the message. To avoid malicious code 
injection to the data carried by the agent, the mobile agent 
carries its own protection by using disposable key pair 
(public and private keys). The Sender’s agent signs the data 
using the private key. The corresponding public key is sent 
to the Recipient’s host together with the signature, which is 
encrypted with the Recipient’s public key. The Recipient’s 
agent can check the integrity of the data by verifying the 
signature with the public key.  
There are also mechanisms that provide Sender a method 
to detect modifications on the mobile code executed at the 
remote hosts. A tracing mechanism is presented in [18], 
which consist of a unique identifier of a statement and a 
signature. When the targeted platform has finished executing 
a code, it produced a tracing log. Then, the result of the 
tracing is sent back to the owner of the agent so that the 
owner can make sure that the code has been executed 
correctly. The ‘phone home’ approach [19] describes a 
method for a mobile agent to contact Sender, to tell Sender 
the current state it was in, or to transfer important data home. 
Therefore, any tampering with the agent can be detected by 
Sender by checking the data received from the agent. Further 
reading on mobile agent security can be found in [20],[21] 
that summarize research works on threats to the agents and 
platforms, as well as the countermeasures. 
In our approach, we keep the encryption details at the 
Sender's side. Therefore, Recipient or any other third party 
does not need to know the details of the decryption process. 
For that reason, it is futile for any third party that tries to 
peek into the data in transit, because the encryption details 
are not there. In addition, the dependency of the mobile agent 
to the Sender’s platform for the additional information for 
encryption processes, allows Sender to know that the agent 
has been correctly executed at the Recipient's platform.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
A security mechanism for mobile agents based on our 
previous research results is presented in this paper.  The 
mobile agent is used as a supporting tool to carry sensitive 
data in e-health. Cryptographic protocols are used to secure 
the mobile agent and the carried data. The key to decrypt the 
ciphertext is kept with Sender. A token is carried by the 
mobile agent to the Recipient’s host. There, the token is sent 
back to Sender as a sign that the agent needs the key to 
decrypt the ciphertext. By using this mechanism, Sender can 
gain control over the plaintext, because Recipient or any 
other third party does not know the details of the decryption 
processes. On the other hand, Recipient does not have to 
cater for the decryption processes and only concern on 
authenticating the agent is from the trusted source, and 
verifying the integrity of the code and plain text.  
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